 I M      are modest. In the first place, I would like to establish some of the analysis of existential constructions in Irish and by so doing to contribute to the comparative typology of existential constructions. At a slightly more ambitious level, I want to use those initial results to engage some of the issues that have shaped the attempt to understand existential constructions more generally. Understanding how existential constructions work involves disentangling a complicated knot of interactions among syntactic, semantic, lexical and pragmatic factors. But much of the work that has grappled with these difficult questions has centered on languages of the same general typological cut as English. And looking only at English, or at languages which work in a similar way, it is hard to disentangle which factors contribute to which observed effect. Consider one such issue-the so-called 'definiteness effect' in existentials (illustrated in ()), which has been at the heart of work on existentials at least since Milsark : () ere were *most people/*all students/few students/many students/?those students/?the students at the meeting.
Certain kinds of nominals are excluded from the post-verbal position; certain others are favored in that position; for a third class, the relevant examples are variable in status and judgments about their acceptability are highly and subtly context-dependent. Understanding the patterns in () has been a complicated matter. One might in principle, for instance, attribute the definiteness effect to the presence of the element there, or to the post-verbal (and therefore non-canonical) position of the subject, or to the particular array of semantic and pragmatic effects that existential structures are used by speakers to convey. Or one might perhaps seek to understand it by appealing to selectional properties of the verb be.
Looking at languages in which the relevant syntactic structures are substantially different from those of English or other well-studied languages can help separate out the contributions of these various factors. In particular, we can ask: as a given aspect of the morphosyntax of an existential structure is varied, which aspects of the semantics and pragmatics co-vary, and which aspects remain constant? Running this kind of natural experiment should help us make some useful deductions about how the various pieces of the existential puzzle fit together and how those pieces interact.
Behind all of this lurks the question of whether or not there is an 'existential construction,' or if the observed properties of the various sentence-types called existential in various   languages can be understood as emerging from the interplay between lexical properties and general principles of syntactic and semantic composition. When one looks at the structures called 'existential' in a range of languages and language-types, it is hard not to be struck by certain commonalities. But saying what the roots of those commonalities might be is, of course, a different matter.
 P: C S For Irish, it will be useful to begin with some of the basics of clause-structure, so that when we consider existential structures specifically, there will be a larger context into which that information can be integrated. As is well known, Irish shows rigid  order in its finite clauses:  In () the finite Tense element has a complement which contains , the maximal verbal projection, within which all of the arguments of the verb (complements and subject) are initially realized. e schematic structure in () is related to the pronounced string in () by way of an operation (head-movement, or Wescoat's () 'lexical sharing') which merges the contents of  and of  in the position of . I will not try to lay out here all the evidence for this overall view (that has been discussed elsewhere), except to say that it lets us understand a large body of observation which collectively suggests that all of the material following the finite verb in a finite clause like () forms a syntactic constituent (see McCloskey , , ). More relevant at present is the fact that these assumptions let us understand the relations among finite clauses, non-finite clauses, and small clauses. e operation which combines the contents of Tense and the contents of  to form an inflected verb does not apply in non-finite clauses. As a    consequence, the skeletal structure in () emerges with subject-initial and verb-medial order  : 'I'd prefer for you to sell them to my brother.'
Verb-medial, subject-initial orders are also found in small clauses (tense-less predicational structures) and since such clauses will be of concern to us shortly, something should be said about their structure. e syntax of small clauses is easier to investigate in Irish than in many other languages because of one crucial syntactic trait: non-finite clauses and small clauses freely allow overt subjects which are accusative in form (McCloskey , McCloskey & Sells ) . is is illustrated for non-finite clauses in (): fuar cold amuigh out an oíche seo this-night 'if it happened to be cold out tonight '    Many of the examples used in this paper have been taken from published sources of one kind or another. When this is the case, it is indicated by way of a tag which consists of an abbreviation of the title of the publication followed by the page number on which it appears, or the date of broadcast in the case of material from radio. e abbreviations used are explained in the Appendix. tithe houses sna in-the bailte towns móra big 'they were o en building houses in the big cities '   An important consequence of the availability of this case-licensing mechanism, as we might expect given Case eory in its classical form, is that small clauses and non-finite clauses with overt subjects are not restricted in their distribution as they are in many other languages. In English, subjects of defective clauses are dependent on elements external to the clause itself for their case licensing. erefore the clauses of which they are subjects can appear only in a very restricted range of syntactic contexts. For the most part, they will appear only in the local domain of case-assigners (so that their subjects can in turn be licensed by those external case-assigners). However in a language which possesses a mechanism for the case-licensing of such subjects independent of the external context, small clauses and non-finite clauses with overt subjects should appear in a broader range of syntactic contexts-in discourse isolation, for instance, as in (): sé he ina aonar, alone é him singil, single é him neamspleách independent 'He lived alone-single and independent (lit him single; him independent)'   or as complements to the adjectives or adverbs of (d), and as complements to unaccusative verbs, as in (a-c). Such possibilities are excluded in English because adjectival and unaccusative predicates cannot license Case on (the specifier of) their complements. ey are not, however, excluded in Irish. e same mechanisms make possible the absolutive construction with agus ('and') illustrated in (): () agus and iad them ar on an the bhealach road 'na bhaile home 'while they were on the way home'    A consequence of this syntactic quirk is that Irish small clauses are more easily manipulated in ways that are useful to the syntactician than are their English counterparts (see Chung & McCloskey  for extensive discussion). All of this will be useful to us here, since it turns out that there is a small clause at the heart of every existential in the language. In each case we have a form of the verb to be, followed by a nominal which corresponds to what has been called the 'pivot' in discussions of the English existential, followed by the element ann. Since this latter element is the most distinctive piece of the Irish existential, we should begin by trying to understand it. At least historically, ann is the rd person singular non-feminine form of the preposition meaning in and so might be translated 'in it'.  Of more interest in the present context, though, is the fact that this form of the preposition has a use as a locative deictic, as illustrated in (), for example: I will use the term 'existential predicate' to refer to ann and I will occasionaly call  of () the 'pivot'. e first conclusion to be established is that the presence of the verb to be in () is in no sense essential in establishing the distinctive syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of the existential construction. In fact, the sequence [  ann ], interpreted as an existential, has a distribution entirely independent of the verb tá-selected, for example, by a range of other verbs, some transitive, some unaccusative:   What these observations collectively indicate is that there is in the language a syntactic constituent of the form in ():
 E: T B
which has the internal structure and external distribution of a small clause, which may appear as a root constituent (as in ()), and which is available for selection by a broad range of lexical items, verbal and non-verbal. e distinctive property of the verb tá is that it selects small clause complements. It is therefore unsurprising that the constituent described in (), should appear as its complement. Given this much, we can refine () to ():
We seem to be dealing, then, with structures like the schematic ():
ann We find confirming support for the claim that ann is a predicate in another aspect of its distribution. Here, the crucial observation is that ann may appear in one of the predicative copula constructions, one which has the schematic structure in (). Here  is a non-verbal predicative phrase and  (preceded by the dative prepostion do) is its subject (Doherty    e syntax here seems, on the face of it, to be very different from that of the small clause predications we examined earlier. However exactly it is to be ultimately understood, what is clear is that the observations fall partly into place if we take ann to be, as suggested by () and (), a predicative expression and one which should therefore appear in the normal range of contexts permitted to predicative expressions more generally-among them the type illustrated in () and (), and the small clause type discussed earlier.
is conclusion is further supported by the observation that in the small clause contexts already discussed, the existential predicate is in complementary distribution with other predicates, a pattern we should expect given that in small clauses there is exactly one 'subject'  and exactly one predicate. is pattern of complementarity is sometimes obscured by the dual use of locative expressions-as predicates and as modifiers: to-you ' ere are people in the town who wouldn't say hello you in the street.
() is perfectly grammatical, but this is because existential ann can be understood as the single predicate licensed in the small clause complement to tá, but the  headed by ar ('on') can still be understood as a locative modifier. As pointed out to me by Joey Sabbagh, however, we can control for this confound by using, in addition to existential ann, a  which has no use as a modifier. e  in (a) is just such an expression, and in this circumstance, the pattern of complementarity emerges with some clarity: is contrast too falls into place if existential ann is exclusively predicative.
If existential ann is a predicate, we can further ask what kind of predicate it is. One of the answers to that question is that it seems to be a stage-level predicate (in the sense of Carlson ). We already saw that ann appears routinely as the predicate of small clause complements to the verb tá ('be'). But Stenson (: -) and Doherty (), both building on a long tradition of observation, argue that such complements are always stage-level.  If that is true, then existential ann is presumably stage-level, consistent with an old intuition about existential claims.
ere may seem to be some tension between this conclusion and the observations at () and () above, since there is a general consensus in the relevant literature that the copula is may combine only with individual-level predicates. e tension is only apparent, however. It is probably true that the copula, in the use illustrated in (), in which the subject of the predication is accusative, selects only individual level predicates: is predication-type (with an accusative subject), along with the restrictions that it is subject to, has been much studied for the Gaelic languages, but the type in (), in which the subject is marked with the dative preposition do, has not, as far as I know, been discussed before. And it is clear that the difference in case-marking of the subject correlates with an important semantic difference, in that the dative type illustrated in () above is not exclusively individuallevel. It would take more work than I can do here to establish whether or not the dative type requires, or simply allows, stage-level predicates in its complement.  Allow them, however, it certainly does. So the appearance of existential ann in this construction is consistent with its characterization as stage-level. Furthermore, the impossibility of ():
() *Is  ann in-it na the cáipéisí. documents ' e documents exist.' (in which existential  appears in the accusative type) is understandable if existential ann is stage-level and if the standard view is correct that copula constructions with accusative subjects are necessarily individual-level. ere is obviously a great deal of hard and delicate work to be done if all of this is to be put on a sound footing, but two conclusions seem warrantedexistential ann is clearly a predicate and, to the extent that these matters are understood at present, ann patterns with stage-level rather than with individual level predicates.
Returning to the central theme, however, it also now follows that existential clauses in Irish of the type in () always involve small clause structures, in some of which (corresponding to bare existentials in English) the predicate is the distinguished element ann, and in others of which some more routine predicative  appears.   Relevant for that investigation, particularly in the context of Ramchand  and Adger & Ramchand , is the impossibility of nominal predicates with dative subjects: (i) *Is  ceoltóir musician cumasach powerful dó. to-him 'He's a powerful musician.' In the system of those papers, the impossibility of (i) would imply an obligatory restriction to stage-level predication (though they eschew the terms 'stage-level' and 'individual-level' and the semantic analysis implied by them.).  As pointed out by a reviewer, an issue now arises about whether or not examples with a predicate other than ann (like () or (), for instance) are or are not existentials. e issue may be terminological rather than substantive. If there is more at stake than nomenclature, then the crucial questions have to do with whether or not the semantic and pragmatic effects considered in Sections ,  and  below (effects which we ultimately at-If it is established that existential ann is a syntactic predicate of a certain type, we can go on to ask about its semantic content. We might in fact begin by asking whether or not it has any semantic content. Given its apparent kinship with English there, which is o en taken to be a semantically empty (expletive) element, one could ask if Irish ann were not similarly a semantically empty (expletive) predicate. Such elements might exist, although I do not know of any convincing examples. We needn't pursue the matter, though, since there is strong evidence that the existential predicate in Irish is not in fact semantically empty. We will see some additional evidence for this conclusion at a later point in the discussion, but for now, the crucial observation is that ann in its existential use can be focused. is possibility is seen in the examples in (), which involve the cle construction. e pragmatic function of a cle is, in general, to express contrastive focus.
() Ba
COP[PAST]
i in nDoire Derry a C rugadh was-born é. him 'It was in Derry that he was born.'
In an example such as (), an alternative-set of places in which he might have been born is introduced, and the assertion is that in just one of those places was he actually born. 'na bhaile home ón from-the aonach, fair ' ere really was good company as we came home from the fair.'   Such examples are difficult to render naturally in English translation, but they are not difficult to understand and they have, as we will see, a natural interpretation in terms of the standard tribute to interpretative properties of ann) extend fully to examples like () and (), which are built around non-existential predicates. is is an important question, but resolving it is an extremely delicate matter empirically and I am unfortunately not in a position to pursue it here. If it turns out that the crucial effects also turn up in such examples, then there must be an additional compositional path which leads to them. One would then need to ask what that path is. Initial indications, though, are that the effects do not hold. As far as I know, for instance, there is no reason to think that the definiteness effect as discussed in Sections  and  belows holds in general for examples of the type in () and (). e matter deserves a thorough discussion though.  I am grateful to Lillis Ó Laoire for a very helpful discussion of the interpretive properties of examples such as those of ().
semantics/pragmatics of contrastive focus.  A way of understanding, say, (a) is that it makes salient an alternative set consisting of two propositions-that an untroubled life was in existence at that time and that an untroubled life was not in existence at that time. Further, it is used to assert the former. If this is even roughly right, it must be that Irish ann, but not English there, is semantically contentful. Compare () with the thorough impossibility of English ():
() *It was there that was plenty of food.
ere is presumably no syntactic flaw in (), given ():
() It was Sally that was the competent one.
However, there is a natural semantic-pragmatic explanation for what goes so badly wrong in (). If the post-copula position of a cle structure is reserved for elements which can be contrastively focused, then the element that occupies that position had better have the kind of semantic content which can support the construction of the appropriate alternative-set. If the nominal there lacks all semantic content, it cannot fulfill this function. But from this line of reasoning it follows in turn that the well-formedness of () must indicate that Irish ann does in fact have the kind of semantic content which would support the construction of the needed alternative set. We will develop a proposal at a later point about what that content might be, but at this point we are in a position to understand a further contrast between English expletive there and Irish ann. In Irish, ann never appears in presentational clauses such as ( on-him ' ere came towards them up the hill a bald man who had no ears. '   Such structures show the empty post-verbal subject positions expected of a null subject language or of a language in which the  is at least partially inactive. If ann is exclusively predicative and semantically contentful, its failure to appear in presentational structures such as () is expected. e general conclusion, then, must be that ann is a predicate which has semantic content (stage-level) and that its semantic content is uniquely appropriate for the expression of existential propositions.
It is tempting at this point to make a connection with the work of Moro (, ), who argues that English there originates as the predicate of a small clause and raises to the specifier position of  under  pressure. On this view, Irish and English existentials would have a  In addition to the interpretation discussed in the text, examples like () also have, unsurprisingly, an interpretation on which ann is a deictic locative. Consultants are clear about this ambiguity.
great deal of their structure in common (they would in effect share underlying forms), the principal difference between the two flowing from the different status of the  in the two languages (always active in English, never or only occasionally active in Irish). I have nothing definitive to say here about this way of making a link between the existential structures of the two languages, but I want to offer two observations that I think are relevant to assessing the viability of this class of proposals.
e first has to do with interpretation. e contrast explored above between () and () suggests that there is an important difference between Irish ann and English there: the former has semantic content, the latter does not (as is traditionally assumed). If these conclusions are correct and if we identify Irish ann with English there in its pre-movement position, then we must construct the raising analysis for English in such a way that the semantic content of predicative there is voided as a consequence of raising. It would surely be possible to develop the needed technology, but it is hardly clear that this is a theoretical possibility that we should countenance.
Also relevant for this discussion are certain structures found in Irish varieties of English, illustrated in ():
ere's no mistake in it. Salmon is good. b.
ere was only the one bit of snow in it last year. c.
ere's no doubt in it.
() ere's people in it wouldn't give you the time of day.
() corresponds to standard English ():
() ere are people who wouldn't give you the time of day.
In these varieties, then, existential sentences have, or may have, the schematic form in ():
e phenomenon illustrated in () and () is widespread in the varieties of English spoken in Ireland and has been much discussed in the dialectological literature-especially in Filppula's comprehensive study (Filppula : -) , from which the examples in () are taken; () is from my own observation. ere is no doubt that the syntactic pattern illustrated in () and () derives from the Irish structures that we are exploring here. What they indicate is that in the language-contact situations in which Irish varieties of English were forged, Irish ann is not identified with English there; rather a newly-minted predicative  is innovated to fulfill the function served by ann in the Irish substrate. It is not obvious how to interpret the evidence of such linguistic transfers, but two observations seem warranted. e first is that Hiberno-English in it, like its Irish source, has semantic content; Bliss () and Henry (), both perceptive observers, assign the meaning 'in existence' to in it in this use. e second observation is that it is hard to see how there in () and () could have raised from the predicate position of the small clause complement of be, since that position is occupied by the  in it. Yet we hardly want to say that there in these Hiberno-English varieties has an entirely different syntax from the instance of there found in 'standard' English.  Returning now to our principal theme, however, we can pull together the threads of the discussion so far as follows: Irish possesses a non-verbal existential predicate ann which, while homophonous with, and diachronically related to, a locative anaphor, is clearly today a distinct lexical item, whose semantic content is uniquely appropriate for the expression of existential propositions. Since this predicate has semantic content, it may be focused, and further it shows the characteristic distribution of a stage-level predicate, appearing either in certain predicative copula constructions, or else as the predicate of a small clause.
With this much in place, we can begin to redeem one of the promissory notes made at the beginning of the paper, by asking how many of the familiar properties of existential structures remain constant in this very language-particular setting and what kinds of differences emerge.
is should put is in a position to make some useful deductions about how the various pieces of the existential puzzle fit together and how those pieces interact. Crucial in this will be the question of what contribution the existential predicate ann makes to the composition of the existential proposition. We begin that investigation in the following section.
 C  L
Many studies of the meaning of existential sentences have made a link between their semantic properties and the semantics of location, where 'location' is o en understood metaphorically (see, for instance, Musan  and Dobrovie-Sorin ). A particularly influential strand of  e construction in () exhibits a number of restrictions which should repay closer investigation. Although (i) is surprisingly impossible: (i) *No tea is in it. the subject position may be occupied by the trace of-movement, as shown in (ii): (ii) a. Given the day that's in it, we really shouldn't be at work at all. b.
She was wearing ashes on her forehead, because of the day that was in it. c.
I just feel lucky to have a job at all, in the times that are in it.
work along these lines has been that pursued by Barbara Partee and Vladimir Borchev in a series of recent papers whose focus is on Russian and on the distribution of genitive case in that language (Borschev & Partee , , Partee & Borschev , , , ) . A core commitment of this body of work is that existential claims are strongly context-dependent, in the sense that they are always made relative to some location-a location which is sometimes metaphorical, which is o en implicit and given by the context, but which nonetheless always functions as the perspectival center. A very similar intuition is developed by Musan (: ):
I assume that there is of a basically definite or deictic nature and indicates to the addressee that he should direct his attention to some location (in a wide sense) that is usually contextually-specified (Lumsden: :ff). . . .
As shown in detail by Francez , it is this property of context-dependence which ensures that those who use existentials are not in general committed to strong existential claims. () can be uttered truly and appropriately even in a context in which it is clear that tea exists in the world and in which this truth is taken for granted by all who take part in the conversation:
() ere was no tea.
An utterance of () asserts only that some salient context or location is such that it includes no instances of the kind tea. is is why () is not contradictory:
() ere was no tea, so we had to buy some.
Two questions at least arise at this point: (i) What is the content of this contextual restriction?
(ii) What is the source of that content in the composition of existential structures? For the first question, the most substantive and empirically successful set of proposals currently available, as far as I know, is due to Itamar Francez (, , ). Francez  shows that the relevant effect is similar to, but crucially distinct from, the normal process of contextual domain restriction for natural language quantifiers. It is distinct from that process in affecting the scope set, rather than the restrictor, of the generalized quantifier denoted by the nominal in pivot position. Fixing the value of the restricting set requires the retrieval of two pieces of information from context: a familiar (inanimate) individual a and a binary relation R. e contextual restriction imposed in the existential, then, corresponds to the set of things which stand in the relation R to the familiar individual a, where the presupposition of familiarity is just that regularly associated with definite expressions. We can illustrate the workings of the proposal informally by considering the fragment of dialogue in ():
 : Why didn't you make breakfast?  : ere was no tea.  : You could've bought some.
For the existential used by speaker  in (), a likely candidate for the salient individual a is the shared home of the two interlocutors, and a plausible candidate for the relation R is the location relation. e content of the contextual restriction, then, can be represented as in ():
In the case of (), when appropriate values for R and a are supplied by the context of use, () comes to denote the set of things which are located in the shared home of the two speakers. Speaker  in the exchange of () is in turn then taken to assert that the intersection of the set of things in the home with the set of things which instantiate the kind tea was null.  Crucially, no general claim about the non-existence of tea is forced. If we accept this general approach to the content of the contextual restriction, we can address the second question-what is the source of this content in the composition of existential propositions? ere are three approaches that I know of.
Borchev and Partee offer the schematic semantic analysis in () for existential sentences in general:
e element  in () is a cover-term for the class of unaccusative and semantically bleached verbs which support the genitive of negation in impersonal constructions in Russian. e ation argument is the source of the contextual dependence of existentials, since it follows from () that existential claims are always made relative to a particular, if metaphorical, location. On this view then, the contextual restriction whose content we have interpreted as in (), following Francez, originates as an implicit argument of the existential verb.  For Bende-Farkas  and for Musan , on the other hand, the relevant restriction originates as part of the content of the element there (or the sequence there be) in English.
Finally, Francez (, , ) argues that the content of () originates as an implicit argument of the pivot nominal. is is one aspect of a more general claim that the pivot nominal acts as the main predicate (in semantic terms at least) in existential structures.
 To be strictly accurate, within the system of Francez , a in (b) will be a location and R the sub-location relation.
 To be more precise, in the analysis of Francez , it is the familiar individual a which is the implicit argument (a definite null anaphor), the relation R being supplied by more general mechanisms of pragmatic inference.
With this much as background, we can return to existentials in Irish. It will surely come as no surprise, to begin with, that the kind of context dependence under discussion here is also a feature of existential structures in Irish. When the example in ()  was used in a recent radio-broadcast:
easpa lack salainn salt [GEN] ann. in-it ' ere's a shortage of salt.' the journalist who used it was not thereby committed to any large or global claim about shortages of salt. Quite the opposite in fact; the question under discussion when () was uttered was why, in the absence of any general shortage of salt in the world or in the country, there was not enough salt in that place (County Donegal) at that time (during a severe snow-storm) to keep roads clear.
If the facts of context dependence in existentials are no different in Irish than they are in English, we can go on to ask if any of the approaches to context dependence outlined above can help us better understand how context dependence manifests itself in Irish existentials.
e answer is that neither the first nor the second can. Consider first the possibility that the contextual restriction has its origin in an implicit argument of the existential verb. At the core of our considerations so far has been the idea that existential structures in the language involve an existential predicate ann which combines with a  to form predicative or small clause structures-small clauses which can in turn be deployed in many contexts which lack a selecting verb or predicate. Yet even in the absence of any governing verb, such structures share all relevant properties (context dependence especially) with existentials in other languages. For instance, the discussion of which () was an actual part might well have continued as in () (b) has the same local and context-dependent interpretation as (); it does not commit a speaker who uses it to the belief that salt does not exist. Here, though, there is no verb to be, and the syntax is probably very different from the syntax of (). What () and () have  Barrscéalta, Raidió na Gaeltachta, Tuesday morning, December th .
 
 in common, of course, is the pivot nominal and also the predicative expression ann. If these conclusions are right, it is unlikely that properties of an 'existential verb' such as  of () can be the source of the context dependence in Irish existentials (whatever about how things work in other languages).
Nor is there an expletive element in Irish existentials in any of their variants (see McCloskey  for general discussion and see the following section for more particular discussion of existential structures). We must therefore seek the source of context-dependence in the composition of the pivot nominal with the existential predicate ann, since only these elements are essential to the building of an existential proposition in Irish. at leaves three possibilities:
○ the contextual restriction is part of the meaning of the pivot nominal (as in the analysis of Francez ),
○ the contextual restriction is part of the meaning of the existential predicate ann, or ○ the contextual restriction is syncategorematic, introduced as part of the compositional step by which ann is combined with the pivot nominal, but not part of the meaning of either element.
We have in fact already encountered observations which should help us to choose among these possibilities. We observed earlier that existential ann may be focused, as shown by the cle examples in (), repeated from (): 'na bhaile home ón from-the aonach, fair ' ere really was good company as we came home from the fair'   From the possibility of (), it follows that ann must have semantic content and we must ask what that content might be. In our preliminary discussion of the interpretation of such examples, we spoke of an alternative set consisting of two propositions-for (a), that an untroubled life was in existence at that time and that an untroubled life was not in existence at that time.
We are now in a position to be a little more precise about this intuition. If we assume that Irish ann expresses the same content o en attributed to the implicit locative argument assumed for other languages, then we begin to understand why examples like ()/() are possible and why they mean what they do. at is, if existential ann introduces an anaphoric element which supplies the kind of contextual restriction in existential propositions argued for by Borchev and Partee, Musan, Bende-Farkas, Francez, and others, and if we follow in its particulars the account of Francez , then ann will have a meaning, and it will have as at least part of its meaning the property of being an x which stands in the relation R to some contextually salient element a (o en, but not always, a location in time or space). at is, it will subsume the content represented by ().
A number of choices arise at this point. It could be that the meaning of ann simply  (). On this view, when the meaning of the small clause headed by ann is composed, the interpretation of ann (namely ()) will compose with the generalized quantifier which is the denotation of its subject, and, as in the analysis of Francez , the meaning of ann thereby comes to define the scope set for the subject quantifier. In the case of (), for instance, this will yield the interpretation in ():
A natural value for a in this context is the spatio-temporal region in which the conversation is taking place and a natural value for R is the binary relation of being in a spatio-temporal region. Interpreted as in (), an utterance of () commits the speaker who used it to the claim that there is an eventuality of the salt-shortage kind which holds of the time and place defined by the conversation of which () was in fact a part. is line of analysis lets us understand the context-dependence of existential claims in Irish within a reasonable framework of syntactic and semantic composition, but the real analytical payoff it yields is that it lets us begin to understand what cases like those in ()/() might mean-cases in which the existential predicate appears in the focus position of a cle . e ordinary semantic value of an example like (a) will be that roughly represented in ():
where, as always, R and a get their values from the discourse context. In this case, since (a) is an expression of nostalgia for a past time and a former state of the world, the value of a is a particular time in the (imagined) past and R is the relation of temporal location. e focus semantic value will be a set of alternative propositions of the same form as (), but with different values assigned to a (and perhaps to the relation R as well, though plausibility concerns will probably rein things in here). e ultimate effect will be that a use of (a) will commit the speaker who uses it to a claim that at such and such a time-and-place, as opposed to other imaginable times and places in an alternative-set (and notably the present time-and-place), life was untroubled. is proposal goes a good distance towards letting us understand the context dependence of Irish existentials. It also begins to let us understand the particular force of cle s like ()/().
But it is not yet enough. e interpretation just sketched (in which one context is compared with another) is indeed available for such cle ed existentials. But more o en, the alternative set conjured up by a use of ()/() consists of just two propositions. In the case of (b), for instance, those two propositions are (i) there was good company in that setting and (ii) that there was not good company in that setting. at is, an important aspect of the interpretation of ()/() is that salient among the alternatives introduced by the focusing effect of the cle are the alternatives of being 'in existence' or 'not being in existence' at some contextually given location, fixed for all of the alternatives. is is the sense in which ann really is an existential predicate, and it is this aspect of its meaning which is not yet captured by the proposal currently on the table. Put differently, this proposal does not yet provide an understanding of what is 'existential' about ann; it is unclear, for example, how in the context of this proposal one would make the crucial distinction between existential ann and the locative deictic ann.
It turns out, I think, that we can make progress on resolving this inadequacy by focusing on two additional questions whose relevance may not initially be obvious but which happen to be important in their own right:
○ How is the sketchy syntax so far outlined to be embedded in a plausible larger theory of clausal syntax in Irish (and in general)?
○ What is the status of the definiteness restriction in Irish?
Answering these two questions will involve us in what may well feel like a lengthy detour from our principal theme. But besides being important in their own right, the two questions turn out to be intimately related and mutually revealing. And they should also lead us back to a possible resolution of the impasse just reached. We can begin with the second question.
 T D R
Consider again our schematic structure (), repeated here as ():
If there were a definiteness effect in Irish of the familiar kind, then the -position of () should be unable to host strong quantifiers, and should be at least inhospitable to definites of various kinds. At first blush, there seems to be no such restriction. Definite descriptions in fact appear freely in the -position of (), as shown for 's headed by the definite determiner in (), and for 's whose definiteness is determined by a definite possessor in (): While cross-linguistic comparison of degrees of acceptability or deviance are extremely difficult, my sense is that the status of these structures in Irish is quite different from their status in English. ere is a reason why in English such examples are o en judged as ill-formed out of context (note the status of the translations in () and ()). ey are never so judged in Irish, as far as I know. We will be in a position, in section , to put this contention on a firmer basis; my conclusion for now, though, is that we have here a real contrast between Irish and English.
Demonstrative descriptions are also well-formed in pivot position, as shown in ( sásta satisfied choíche. ever ' ere is everyone who will never be satisfied.'
Before we try to understand this pattern and its relation to manifestations of the definiteness effect in other languages, and in particular before we address the question of why the definites seem to pattern differently in Irish, we need to revisit our assumptions about how clauses are built in Irish. For it turns out that when we pay closer attention to the syntax of subject-hood in Irish, things become more complicated in an interesting and useful way.
 C A R
Consider once more the schematic structure in (), repeated here as ():
 To be more precise-such examples are acceptable to the extent that they lend themselves to an interpretation involving a physical location, one involving the basic interpretation of ann as a deictic locative. When consultants are pushed to consider the existential interpretation, they typically report that it is impossible to work out what the examples ought to mean.     On this view, the functional head corresponding to inflectional material is unitary and selects the verbal projection; the subject does not raise, but rather surfaces in the same position in which it is thematically licensed. e verb however, in amalgamating with inflectional material, raises past the un-raised subject, giving  order.
Pleasing as this view is, it is known to be too simplistic. ere is clear evidence that the subject in fact raises out of the verbal projection into the inflectional layer. at evidence is discussed in some detail in McCloskey ,  and will not be rehearsed here. However, one relevant set of observations will be useful for the present discussion. ere is a class of adverbs which can appear following the subject but preceding complements and -level adjunctsriamh (ever), go fóill (still, yet), fós (still, yet), choíche (ever), i gcónaí (always), go minic (o en).
ey correspond closely to the class identified as -external or -peripheral in much comparative work, and there is in addition strong evidence from within the language that they are -external (from the study of ellipsis and from the study of non-finite clauses, in which verbs do not front). e examples in () are typical.    Complement Given (), there are two distinct projections in the inflectional layer between  and , and the verb raises to a head-position above and to the le of the projection to which the most prominent case-less nominal in  raises. It is an important question what these inflectional projections are ( and  of ()), but it is not one that we need to resolve in order to make progress on our current questions.
 T D R R
e crucial observation is now that, given (), or similar elaborations, it is impossible on the basis of simple inspection of the word order alone, to know for a structure like ():
   whether  occupies the higher or the lower of the two 'subject-positions' in (). For existential structures, this question is of central importance, since a nominal 'trapped' within  could very well support a different range of interpretations than one which has been raised out of  and into the inflectional layer (see especially Diesing  and a great deal of related and subsequent work). e -peripheral adverbials discussed at (), however, provide us with a probe which will distinguish the two positions. Nominals which appear to the right of such adverbs must presumably be in the lower of the two positions of (), while nominals to the le of them must have raised out of . Now note that in existentials (and in certain closely related clause-types), the subject may follow a -edge adverb; examples with the general structure in () occur freely, as shown in () In all of the examples of (), the nominal in the lower (post-adverbial) position is indefinite.
is is no accident. In the context of (), the definiteness effect re-emerges in full and familiar form. feirmeoir farmer uair time ann in-it 'He said that there was once a farmer. '   e correct generalization, then, is that only indefinites have the option of remaining in the lower of the two positions of ().
Further evidence for the existence of these two positions and for the special role that the lower position plays in existential structures, can be gleaned from the examples in (), whose relevance for the present context was first brought to my attention by Cathal Doherty. In these examples, it seems that both the lower and higher positions are simultaneously occupied: triúr three deartháir brothers ann in-it ' ere were three brothers of them.'
 
In such cases (which are felt by many contemporary speakers to be formal, if not archaic), there is a definite description in the immediate post-verbal position and an 'additional' cardinality expression to the right of the definite description, but to the le of the existential predicate. I cannot claim to understand the syntax of () (it is unclear to me in particular whether or not the higher and lower 'subject' positions are related by movement), but I suspect that the phenomenon represents a species of Quantifier Float however that phenomenon is ultimately to be understood. Partial understanding is possible, however, and if the definite and the cardinality expressions of () occupy the higher and the lower subject positions respectively of (), then the contrast exemplified in (), which is stark, falls into place: scai e crowd mór big ann. in-it ' ere's always a big crowd of them.'
We should note in passing that the observations made in ()-() provide confirmation for a decision made earlier about how the definiteness effect presents itself in Irish. In discussing the status of definite descriptions in the subject position of Irish existentials (see ()-() above) we claimed that they were fully acceptable, by contrast with their English counterparts:
an the Drochshaol Famine ann in-it 'When there was the Famine'   is decision was made despite the fact that there has been controversy among researchers about the status of English examples like the translation of (). But we have just seen that the contrast in acceptability between the b-examples and the a-examples of ()-() is strongly felt, a fact which falls into place naturally if the b-examples are unacceptable to the same extent and for the same reasons as the corresponding English examples, while the a-examples are in fact fully well-formed (an interpretation confirmed by consultants).
Returning to the central theme, however, the principal conclusion here is the following. Although Irish seems at first to present a language-particular variant of the definiteness effect, it turns out that this is an illusion born of insufficiently careful syntactic analysis. Closer examination reveals that the range of nominals which may appropriately occur in the lower of the two subject positions of Irish existentials is exactly the same as those which may occur in the post-verbal (and lower) position in English existentials. Put differently: when we compare analogous syntactic positions in the two languages, we find analogous restrictions on the kinds of nominals which may occupy those positions. ere is an important sense, in other words, in which the definiteness effect in Irish is just like the definiteness effect of English.
But there remains an important difference between the two languages. While the acceptability of definites as pivots depends on their syntactic position, strong quantifiers are categorically excluded as subjects of existentials, whether they occupy the higher or the lower of the two positions of (). Examples such as (), repeated from (), are impossible: sásta satisfied choíche. ever ' ere is always everyone who will never be satisfied.'    ere is a contrast here with English to the extent that the examples in () correspond, when viewed from a certain perspective, to (b), which is fully acceptable and fully interpretable.
() a. * ere is everyone in the room who needs to be here. b. Everyone is in the room who needs to be here.
In the Irish examples of (), and in (b) in English, the strong quantifier has raised to the higher subject position (plausibly the specifier position of Tense in both languages). is raising 'solves the interpretability problem' for English, so to speak, but does not for Irish. Now one's intuitions are surely screaming at this point that (b) is not an existential and that there is therefore no reason to think that the definiteness effect would be at play. While that intuition is surely correct, the challenge is to say what it means to be, or not to be, an 'existential'. In its turn, the answer to that question is in a certain sense obvious. Irish and English are surely different because of the necessary presence of existential ann in Irish and the absence of such an element in English. at intuition is confirmed by the routine observation that () (without ann) is well-formed:
() Tá is achan every duine person i láthair. present 'Everyone is present.' or indeed by the observation that the examples of () are in fact acceptable and interpretable when ann is not existential but is rather the deictic locative anaphor. In all of the cases that succeed, what is absent is a forced interaction between a strong quantifier and the existential predicate ann.
How, though, should we cash these intuitions out formally? e section that follows builds an analysis of the various threads of observation laid out so far, with the goal of being clearer about what it might mean to call ann a 'distinctively existential element'.
 C  E P
In understanding existential structures in Irish and how they are composed, the principal challenge is to understand the syntax and semantics of the existential predicate ann. As we saw in section , there is abundant evidence that ann is a predicate and also that it is a semantically contentful stage-level predicate. We have also seen (in section ) that there is evidence that the existential predicate is the locus of the particular kind of context-dependence documented by Francez as being characteristic of existential propositions generally, a conclusion which is entirely in harmony with the stage-level status of ann. In the same discussion, however, we also found reason to suspect that this was not the whole story-that ann is semantically richer than this analysis would suggest. Section  provided a new way of reasoning about what that additional content must be. For what was established there was that the definiteness effect in Irish is not unitary, but consists rather of two distinct restrictions:
○
ere is an absolute ban on strong quantifiers in existential structures, one which holds whether the pivot nominal occupies the higher or the lower subject position (call this -).
ere is a distinction between definite and indefinite descriptions, which is sensitive to the syntactic prominence of the pivot: low 's, and only low 's, are required to be indefinite. Call this -. Importantly, definite descriptions, unlike strong quantifiers, can be the subject of ann, as long as they occupy the higher of the two available subject positions.
ere is, as we have seen, abundant evidence that - reflects some compositional incompatibility between existential ann and the strong quantifiers. It follows, then, that whatever interpretation is assigned to ann should guarantee that incompatibility.
ere is in fact an existing analysis of existential propositions in which the split between - and - emerges as particularly natural-the analysis developed by Louise McNally (; ; ), which builds in turn on work by Michael Lumsden ().  is analysis shares with other approaches the idea that the pivot nominal of an existential is propertydenoting rather than quantificational (Milsark , Van Geenhoven , Chung & Ladusaw , Sabbagh ) , but it is distinctive in two related ways. e first is that it is one of the few proposals about existential semantics in which a principled connection is made between the truth-conditional content of existential propositions and the definiteness effect. e second is that it builds in, in a particularly deep way, the contrast that we have just exposed in the Irish data between strong quantifiers on the one hand and definite expressions on the other.
McNally's proposal is that the definiteness effect is not unitary but rather has two distinct sources. Quantified nominals are excluded from the pivot position of existentials on semantic grounds-in essence because when they are deployed in existential contexts an irreparable compositional incompatibility results. Definite descriptions, proper names and pronouns, on  See also Zucchi , Musan , Ward & Birner  and for closely related proposals Milsark , Landman . the other hand, are excluded from the pivot position (weakly) on pragmatic grounds, and the acceptability of the structures of which they are a part is as a consequence sensitive to aspects of the discourse context in a way that the first effect is not.
e core of the proposal is the postulation of an intransitive predicate-that of being instantiated (at a particular index). is is the main predicate in an existential proposition and it takes the property denoted by the pivot as its sole argument. e proposition so formed is true if and only if the property denoted by the pivot is instantiated by some individual at the index of evaluation. e analysis can be implemented in two ways. One can assume that the property plays its role in the composition directly (the predicate  takes a property as its argument). McNally's actual proposal, though (in most presentations of the analysis) is more elaborate. Pivots are taken not to denote properties, but rather the entity correlate of a property, in the sense of Chierchia  and Chierchia & Turner . Being of the type of entities, they are reifications of the properties of which they are correlates and they can serve as arguments of predicates of the most basic type (the type <e,t>). On this view, then, the predicate  is of type <e,t> but it is subject to a sortal restriction that it combines only with the sort of individuals that are the correlates of properties. On this version of the analysis, an existential such as (a) with the logical form in (b) will be true (at a given index) if the property of being a queue is instantiated by some entity.
() a. ere's a queue.
Distinguishing between the two variants of the core proposal is a subtle matter and it will not much matter for our purposes here how it is ultimately resolved. However, in light of the arguments developed in McNally , I will work here with the slightly more elaborate analysis stated in terms of entity correlates of properties.
However implemented, the proposal yields an intuitively satisfying semantics for existential propositions, and it also gives rise to some expectations about how the definiteness effect should work. Since the predicate  of () selects entity correlates of properties, any  which can plausibly be so interpreted will be expected to yield a well-formed interpretation when deployed in the pivot position. If weak 's  are correctly viewed as property- Since the terms were first introduced by Milsark, there has been some variation in how the terms 'strong' and 'weak' are used. Our usage here is different from at least some common uses in the literature. For Barwise & Cooper () , for example, proper names and definite descriptions count as 'strong' quantifiers. For our purposes here, though, it is crucial that proper names and definite descriptions can be at least coerced into being propertydenoting.
denoting, then it is expected that they would appear naturally in pivot position. On the other hand, those quantificational 's which cannot be interpreted as property-denoting (or typeshi ed in such a way that they can be so interpreted) will be rigidly excluded from the pivot position. is is why necessarily quantificational expressions such as universal and proportional quantifiers are definitively excluded from pivot position in existentials.  Definites, demonstratives, pronouns and proper names, on the other hand, are expected to behave differently. Since they can be type-shi ed to a property-type (Partee ), we expect them to have well-formed interpretations in existential contexts. e infelicitousness of such expressions in existential contexts must then reflect the operation of some different, and presumably pragmatic, mechanism.  e two-part definiteness effect that we see so clearly in the Irish facts provides strong support for the basic thrust of McNally's proposals. ose proposals, in turn, provide us with a way of understanding -, by guaranteeing the needed incompatibility between ann and true quantifiers (universal and proportional). e basic idea is that the predicate - of McNally's analysis is a central component of the semantic content of existential ann. We can implement this idea, while preserving our conclusion from section  that ann is also the locus of context-dependence, by assigning the interpretation in () to ann in its existential use  :
is interpretation combines two central elements-McNally's fundamental semantics for existentials with Francez' theory of the context-dependence of existential propositions. () en- If the analysis is implemented directly in terms of properties, the exclusion will be on the basis of a typeclash. On the approach of (b), stated in terms of entity-level correlates of properties, the relevant examples will violate a sortal restriction on the instantiation predicate. I will use the term 'compositional incompatibility' to cover both alternatives.
 See McNally , ,  for the details. See Francez : - and Francez  for a critique and McNally  for a partial response. One of the issues at play is that McNally's analysis requires that all nonmonotone-increasing quantifiers be decomposed. A weak pivot such as no man, for example, must be analyzed as involving a high sentential negation which has an indefinite (providing the property denotation) in its scope.
e plausibility of McNally's analysis depends then in part on the general plausibility of such decompositions. For relevant discussion see Ladusaw , Potts  among many others.
 A reviewer worries that there may be an incompatibility between the proposal in () and our earlier, and somewhat tentative, conclusion that existential ann is a stage-level predicate, since 'instantiate' is surely a property which holds of a kind rather than an instance of a kind and of an individual rather than of a stage of an individual. What renders the existential predicate at least stage-like, I believe, is the requirement of spatio-temporal grounding provided by the second term in (). is conclusion may require us to re-think some of the already obscure material of Section  above and to re-think whether the distinctions explored there are properly characterized as distinctions between types of predicates; see Adger & Ramchand  for relevant discussion. codes a second-order property-the property a property has when it is instantiated by some individual x located at a contextually defined (and perhaps metaphorical) spatio-temporal location a. When existential ann is used as the predicate of a small clause, the interpretation in () will combine with the interpretation of the small clause subject resulting in a proposition whose content is either that the property denoted by the subject is instantiated in a particular context or it is not. Consider a case like (), for example:
Tá is fion wine ann. in-it ' ere's wine.'
Here the crucial substructure is the small clause consisting of the subject nominal fíon and the predicate ann. Functional application  will yield () as the interpretation of this small clause:
() denotes the proposition that (at a given index) the property of being an instance of the kind wine is instantiated by some entity x at a contextually salient spatio-temporal location a-say the present home of the interlocutors for a given use of (). Consider the merits of this proposal.
One of the things that we have been seeking throughout this paper is some way of making sense of the intuitive notion 'existential predicate'. What we have in () is such a proposal, one that says that the crucial property is that of being instantiated (in McNally's sense) at some contextually defined perspectival center. is does not seem like an unreasonable view of what it might mean to be an existential predicate.
It also follows, of course, that - should hold, just as on McNally's analysis. Any structure which forces us to compose the meaning in () with the meaning of a proportional or universal quantifier will give rise to an irreconcilable type-clash. Or it will at least for any quantification over individual-level variables. If the relevant quantifiers in subject position were to quantify over entity correlates of properties rather than over individuals, then they should behave like any other quantified argument. In McNally's account, this observation forms the basis for understanding Lumsden's () ann. in-it ' ere was every kind of food and every kind of drink.' All in all, then, the proposal in () undergirds what seems to be a successful theory of that aspect of the definiteness effect that we have called here -. For the second aspect of the restriction-what we have called here --we are pretty much where we were before consideration of the Irish facts. What needs to be understood is why indefinites favor lower, -internal positions while definites favor higher, -external positions. ere are a number of proposals on the market which aim to account for this pattern,  and I have little to add here to those debates, save to point to one area of progress: the Irish pattern is now revealed (see section ) to conform closely to the more general and expected pattern and to be less idiosyncratic than it seemed at first to be.
A crucial component of this set of proposals is syntactic, in the following sense: the semantic content needed for constructing existential propositions is in Irish lexicalized in the predicative expression ann. is expression is in turn an obligatory sub-part of the larger structures in which it appears (see section  above); that is, it is impossible to build a small clause without a predicate and a subject. In English there is no such predicate and the relevant semantic content is lexicalized differently. Presumably the content expressed by ann in Irish is lexicalized in English within a verb-in existential be or, more likely, in one of the functional heads in v that are gathered up to be realized morphologically as be (see Deal , especially section ). e fact, then, that () in English (repeated here as ()) is available reflects the availability of a non-existential use of be (one that involves no use of the predicate  central to McNally's analysis):
Everyone is in the room who needs to be here.
For Irish (), on the other hand, there is no escape from the compositional dilemma created by the obligatory presence of the existential predicate ann.  On this view there is presumably an ungrammatical version of English (), based on 'existential be,' whose ungrammaticality is however masked by the availability of an alternative path (non-existential) to the surface form in (). A challenge for everyone is to better understand what, if anything, is the common property which unifies the various different uses of be so that they have a common morphological realization. See also note .
Just as important as the account that it yields of the definiteness effect, however, is the fact that the proposal in () provides an answer to a different question, one which has haunted us almost from the beginning of the present paper. is is the question of what it could mean to focus the existential predicate ann, as happens in the cle examples of ()/(). One of the relevant examples is presented again in ():
a' the chuideachta good-company a' teacht come [PROG] 'na bhaile home ón from-the aonach, fair ' ere really was good company as we came home from the fair'
  If we make use of a standard set of proposals for the semantics of focus (the 'alternative semantics' for focus), going back to the seminal work of Mats Rooth (see Rooth , , von Stechow ) , then the semantic reflex of focus is a second semantic value, one which for a clause consists of a set of propositions. is second-tier semantic value renders salient a set of claims which might have been made but which were not, thus providing an understanding of the sense in which focus, of this type at least, is fundamentally contrastive. For specificity, let us adopt the framework of Rooth , and consider how the meaning of an example like () will be composed. e focus semantic value for () will be computed by substituting for the focused predicate ann a free variable of the same type as its ordinary semantic value (which is () on the account we are now exploring). Various plausible values can be assigned to that variable depending on the context of use. Given () a reasonable alternative value to consider would surely be ():
is (when composed with the ordinary semantic value of the subject nominal) will yield the interpretation we have been seeking-one on which the salient alternative is the negation of the proposition expressed in the ordinary semantic value of (). us, the alternative set conjured up by a use of () consists of two propositions: (i) there was good company in that setting and (ii) that there was not good company in that setting. In this interpretation, the context is fixed and the polarity of the proposition expressed shi s among alternatives. But it will also be possible to shi the value assigned to the individual a (the spatio-temporal anchor for the existence claim) in constructing alternatives; this option will lead to interpretations on which the pragmatically relevant contrast involves different spatio-temporal contexts in which the existential claim is asserted to hold (in which the property expressed by the pivot is instantiated). We thus arrive at the kind of understanding of these crucial examples that we identified in section  as being needed.  In sum, the proposal developed here seems to provide an understanding of the local and context dependent character of existential claims (essentially as in the work of Francez). It also provides an understanding of how the definiteness effect manifests itself in Irish, and of the ways in which the definiteness effect in Irish resembles that found in other languages and also of the ways in which it is distinctive. It does that without appealing to arbitrarily different language-particular variants of the definiteness effect. It also provides a semantics for the existential predicate ann which seems reasonable at an intuitive level and which allows an understanding of why it can be focused (see ()/()). In addition, it provides some understanding of what such examples may convey. Finally, the whole account is embedded in a framework for syntactic and semantic composition which involves few or no exotic mechanisms.
 T L C
is paper opened by announcing two goals-(i) to contribute to the comparative typology of existential structures by providing a reasonably detailed study of their manifestation in one language and (ii) to use that starting point to address some of the more general issues raised by the study of existentials. In this brief final section I would like to focus more explicitly on those larger issues.
As far as I know, the kind of dedicated non-verbal existential predicate that has been the focus of attention here has not been identified or discussed before. e existence of this type is of some interest in its own right, but focusing on it has an additional useful consequence. Since the syntax that is determined by this predicate is quite different from the syntax of existentials  e text discussion assumes that the existential expression ann is atomic. is assumption may be incorrect, though. Such inflected prepositions (recall that ann is the rd person singular non-feminine form of the preposition meaning in) more usually reflect a syntax in which a preposition projects a maximal phrase and selects a null pronominal as its complement. If the analysis of existential ann is not different from these more routine cases (a conclusion which may well be suggested by the coining of the Hiberno-English equivalent in it) and it therefore has a complex internal structure, then other analytical possibilities suggest themselves. For instance, it may be that it is the preposition in which introduces the predicate  and that it is the silent pronominal which introduces the spatio-temporal anchor. On this view, () would not be the lexical meaning of an atomic element ann but would rather be composed from the interpretations of its sub-parts. On this view, one would have to consider the possibility of separate focus features on the two core sub-constituents-on the preposition and on the null pronominal. is could provide an alternative way of understanding the two readings associated with the cle examples.
in other languages, we have the opportunity of running the natural experiment anticipated in the introduction. at is, we can ask how many of the familiar properties of existential structures remain constant in this very different syntactic environment, and what kinds of differences emerge as the syntax, so to speak, shi s. is mode of reasoning proved useful especially in the support that it uncovered for the kind of bifurcated view of the definiteness effect argued for by McNally (see sections  and ).
At this point a typological question naturally arises: are there are other languages that make use of an element like Irish ann? at issue is beyond the scope of the present paper, but Rita Manzini suggests (personal communication) that the locative clitics found in existentials in many Romance languages (French y, Italian ci, Catalan hi and so on) could be viewed in such terms: will. want ' ere is an entire generation that wants to work. ' Hartmann presents evidence that da is not an expletive element, but is rather an anaphoric expression referring to the 'here and now' of the speaker. In construction with the verb sein it expresses existential propositions, a use in which it is incompatible with strong quantifiers in the pivot position, but compatible with definites (Hartmann : -) .
Whatever the fate of such speculations, it will be interesting to see if other plausible instances of non-verbal existential predicates are identified as investigation proceeds. And it will be particularly interesting to investigate what the interaction is with definiteness effects in those languages which deploy such predicates.
Is there a general theory of existentials across languages, a common form behind the diversity so far discovered? Much current discussion assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, that there is a common syntax (and o en a common compositional semantics) for existentials across languages. e presupposition of a common form o en emerges in discussions of whether the '-analysis' (in which an existential verb selects a single nominal complement) or the 'small clause analysis' (in which an existential verb selects a bare predicational nexus) is generally correct. But as more subtle analyses of a broader range of languages have been constructed, it seems increasingly unlikely that there is such a common form for existentials across languages. e -analysis seems more or less unassailable for languages such as Chamorro (Chung ), Maori (Chung & Ladusaw ) , or Tagalog (Sabbagh ). But the evidence for a small clause analysis seems equally persuasive for Irish (see especially section  above). And in English, both possibilities are surely called for. ere is no plausible way of analyzing (a) in terms other than the -analysis; but equally, there is no good way of analyzing (b) in terms other than (something like) the small clause analysis (Keenan , Rezac ).
() a. ere's no tea. b.
ere were tabs being kept on these people.
What seems to be common across languages, rather, are the semantic primitives out of which existential propositions can be constructed. ese primitives can be assembled into lexical items in different ways in different languages, initial choices which then drive the compositional engine in routine and very general ways (see Sabbagh  for similar conclusions). ose semantic primitives have in turn presumably a deeper conceptual grounding (in the centrality of notions of location in human cognition, for instance), in ways that have come to the fore especially in the cross-linguistic study of predicates expressing psychological states (Jackendoff : , note , Landau ).
ere are no existential constructions here, of the kind considered in Lakoff  or Johnson . More generally, this is the kind of landscape which we would expect to find ourselves in if the principal locus of variation among languages was in the content of functional vocabulary items, in interaction with very general principles of syntactic and semantic composition.
